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Abstract 
The Japanese Post Office, one of the world’s largest financial 
institutions, was finally privatised in 2015, marking an appropriate time to 
examine financialisation in Japan. Literature on financialisation and changes 
in Japanese capitalism assumes convergence on Anglo-American capitalism 
with a diminishing of state power. The main argument of this paper is that 
financialisation is instead a more contingent process. This is put forth 
through an examination of how this process has been mediated by the 
Japanese state through the workings of the Japanese Post Office. The state 
has frequently shaped the direction of financialisation by intervening in the 
routing of household funds via the postal savings system in order to achieve 
its objectives in different circumstances, particularly evident in the 
protracted and contested nature of the post bank’s privatisation. 
Financialisation is thus not preordained; instead its path is hewn by crisis, 
catastrophe, demographics and the agency of domestic social actors. 
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Introduction 
Japan’s slide into prolonged economic stagnation during the 1990s 
followed the bursting of an asset-price bubble which brought an end to 
predictions of global economic dominance in a ‘Pax Nipponica’ (E. Vogel 
1986: 752). Its decline was almost as spectacular as its ascent had been 
before, as government debt levels rose hugely (Kang 2010: 558). Anglo-
American capitalism’s renewed success was built on neoliberal policies and 
a dynamic and all-powerful financial industry. It seemed to now offer the 
best path to prosperity amounting to an endorsement of calls for wholesale 
changes to the Japanese system (Streeck and Yamamura 2003: 9-10). 
Successive prime ministers implemented reform agendas of liberalisation, 
deregulation and privatisation, most recently aimed at creating a ‘fully 
competitive, effective, and efficient financial system’ (Hoshi and Patrick 
2000: 26).  
 
The global economic crisis has been described as ‘one outcome of 
the financialisation of contemporary capitalism’ (Lapavitsas 2009b: 114). 
The financialisation literature analyses systemic changes in advanced 
capitalism over the last 30 which are linked with diminished government 
powers (Epstein 2005: 3) through the advent of the neoliberal paradigm in 
the early 1970s (Kotz 2008: 10-11). Especially pertinent because of Japan’s 
main bank system is how banking and its close connection to workers’ 
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personal income has been transformed (Lapavitsas 2009a: 6). Some authors 
have seen the trajectory of transformation in Japan as echoing what has 
already happened in other mature capitalist economies; inevitable 
convergence on neoliberalism and a loss of power through continual 
competitive liberalisation among states because of pressures from global 
financial markets (Cerny 2001; Dore 2000a, 2000b). However, while the 
trend towards financialisation in Japan is acknowledged (Lapavitsas 2009b: 
127) none of the above literature investigates the extent of or the manner in 
which this has proceeded. A further problem lies in the realm of power. 
Representations of financialisation as unstoppable convergence on Anglo-
American capitalism present it as a continual lessening of state power. 
 
However, the outcome of financialisation is not preordained but is 
heavily contingent, particularly because the agency of the state is still 
crucial. The Japanese system of ruling by consensus has been characterised 
as an “iron triangle” between politicians, bureaucrats and big business in 
which ‘the politicians reign and the bureaucrats rule’ (Johnson 1982: 316). 
Besides overstating the consensual nature of Japanese governance, this does 
not sufficiently capture the complexity of relationships between ‘shifting 
coalitions of diverse interests’ (Leftwich 1995: 406). These relationships are 
profoundly political (Curtis 1999: 9) and are embodied in the workings of 
the Japanese Post Office, a pivotal state institution with contradictory 
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interests (Moran 1991: 107). The significance of the post office lies in its 
involvement in the ‘transformation of everyday saving’ which is ‘contingent’ 
and ‘contested’ (Langley 2008: 240). As it attempts to gather household 
deposits to mobilise for state use, its actions heavily impinge upon and are 
impinged upon by other actors in the financial system. Until recently the 
largest financial institution in the world, it plays a special role in the 
financial system that is unparalleled elsewhere (Cargill and Yoshino 2000: 
201-3). Delayed since 2007, its privatisation finally took place in late 2015 
and marks an opportune occasion to examine its role with regard to 
financialisation in Japan. 
 
The main aim of this paper is to complement the financialisation 
literature by examining how it has unfolded in Japan. This will be 
undertaken by studying the workings of the state through the post office, an 
institution with a singular role in the Japanese financial system. In detailing 
the specific way in which financialisation has developed, this paper will 
help to account for a lack of convergence on Anglo-American style 
neoliberalism. The paper is structured as followed; I first examine some of 
the work discussing financialisation and changes in Japanese capitalism. 
Following this, I borrow from work in the institutionalist tradition 
differentiating between neoliberalism as ideology and as practise and ally 
this with work on the structure/agency debate within critical theory. Finally, 
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following an account of the origins of the Japanese financial system, I 
embark upon an analysis of how the post office has mediated 
financialisation in Japan from the 1970s until its privatisation in late 2015. 
 
 
Transformations in Japanese capitalism 
Financialisation has been defined as ‘the increasing role of financial 
motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the 
operation of the domestic and international economies’ (Epstein 2005: 3) 
with this 'dominance of finance over industry' coming 'at the expense of real 
investment' (Fine 2009: 3-6). The concept has arisen in an attempt to 
correlate flourishing finance with the poor performance of production and to 
understand the systemic and structural transformation of mature capitalist 
economies since the 1980s (Lapavitsas 2011: 611). It is linked to 
neoliberalism (Fine 2010: 22) via a reduced role for the state (Epstein 2005: 
3). The financialisation literature has an overwhelmingly Western focus and 
is particularly US-centric (Casey 2011; Krippner 2005; Orhangazi 2008a; 
2008b). However, the US is ‘an ideal type of financialization in an 
exceptional macroeconomic environment’ (van Treeck 2009: 922) and 
much of the literature has not provided an account of the extent to which the 
process has unfolded elsewhere. A significant characteristic, particularly 
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considering Japan’s bank-centred financial system, is a change in the 
operations of banks (Lapavitsas 2008, 2009b; dos Santos 2009).  
 
Japanese capitalism differs from Anglo-American capitalism in 
some key ways, namely: a favouring of employees over shareholders; a 
preference for doing business on the basis of relationships built over time, 
including relational banking; a less competitive and more co-operative 
approach towards competitors; and a strong role for the state in supplying 
public goods and arbitrating between private actors rather than allowing the 
market to decide (Dore 2000a, 23-48). A pivotal element of the 
developmental state’s successful operation is the governance of the financial 
system, in particular the relationship between the government and the banks 
(Cerny 2005: 90). The interlocking institutions providing the fundaments of 
this system were the strict rationing by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) of 
foreign exchange, the strict and strategic apportioning of domestic capital to 
particular infant industries, and the set of informal and formal practices 
known as administrative guidance whereby supervising ministries 
effectively told banks and firms ‘how to run their businesses’ (Cerny 2001: 
105-6).  
 
Financialisation is ‘a convenient word for a bundle of more or less 
discrete structural changes in the economies of the industrialized world’ 
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(Dore 2008: 1097) which are gradually also affecting Japan for a number of 
reasons; the changed economic circumstances of the end of the high-growth 
developmental state era; the apparent superiority of the American model 
after the decade-long economic stagnation of the 1990s; long-term changes 
in Japanese values as its society becomes less homogenous (Dore 2000a: 
51-70). While pressures for liberalisation come from domestic state and 
business actors in response to declining competitiveness and from neoliberal 
and internationalist-minded elements (Cerny 2001: 100-3; Cerny 2005: 97-
101), there is ‘a deep structural tension … between the internationalization 
of finance, on the one hand, and national economic policy autonomy, on the 
other’ (Cerny 1996: 87). Convergence on the US model of capitalism is held 
to be unstoppable (Dore 2000a: 220; Cerny 2001: 116, 2000: 32), 
constraining the ability of the state to direct the flow of funds within the 
economy and instead ensuring that investment flows to market-determined 
uses (Cerny 2001: 109). 
 
However, an inexorable shift towards neoliberalism in Japan has, as 
yet, not been borne out and is held to be exaggerated, while compliance with 
international regulatory standards has been superficial (Walter 2006: 418-9). 
The assumption of convergence on neoliberalism, as states are increasingly 
disempowered to resist the changes foisted upon them by processes outside 
their control, obscures the choices made by actors in influencing the course 
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of financialisation. The problem with assigning social transformation to 
processes which actors do not have the capability to direct, such as the 
perceived imperatives of globalisation and financialisation, is that it entails a 
degree of fatalism (Hay 2007: 87). Although it is certainly evident that there 
have been changes to Japan’s financial system as a result of liberalisation 
and deregulation, some commentators contend that economic nationalism is 
a crucial driver of how liberalisation has been shaped (D. Hall 2004: 80). 
Accordingly, what is important is not the amount of state intervention but 
the nature of it and the objectives which it intends to achieve. This 
challenges the assumption that financialisation results in a weakening of 
state power, with states forced into a continual loss of autonomy through 
competitive liberalisation and deregulation. Thus, while acknowledging the 
influence of various actors, the aforementioned literature presents a 
sometimes structural consideration of power in which agency is reduced and 
depoliticised as agents’ destiny is determined by processes beyond their 
control (Hay 2007: 67). 
 
Alternative views stress the opportunities for action that 
globalisation grants states. Here, adaptation to the challenges of 
globalisation rather than convergence on a neoliberal type of state is seen as 
a more likely outcome because of the flexibility that states exhibit in 
responding to the challenges posed by change and in handling the 
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interaction between government and business (Weiss 1997: 26-7). In the 
following sections, I ally some writing on agency in critical theory with 
work distinguishing neoliberal practice from ideology. Informed by this, I 
undertake an examination of financialisation in Japan focusing on the post 
office. The objective is to explain the absence of convergence on 
neoliberalism, perceiving financialisation as a contingent and political 
process rather than the inexorable unfolding of a structural logic. 
 
 
Re-institutionalising control 
In aiming to ascertain the manner in which financialisation, a 
process of social change, has been mediated in Japan, critical theory is the 
most appropriate method because it ‘does not take institutions and social 
and power relations for granted but calls them into question’ (Cox 1981: 
129). In structural approaches to social change, power is presented as being 
‘embedded in the very structure of society’ and this obscures from view 
ways to see how it is possible to overcome the tendencies which are implicit 
in the structures themselves (Knafo 2010: 493). Critical theory deals with ‘a 
continuing process of historical change’ (Cox 1981: 129), thus, historical 
analysis of structures and power ‘from the perspective of the agents 
involved and the change that they generate’ (Knafo 2010: 512) allows a 
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shift from structural theories of financialisation towards showing its 
specificity in the context of Japan by prising apart practice from ideology. 
 
Akin to a Polanyian ‘disembedding of finance from institutional 
frameworks and political authority’, much of the critical IPE literature 
portrays financialisation and neoliberalism as a process of financial markets 
becoming deinstitutionalised as they are liberated from an older (pre-1970s) 
institutional environment (Konings 2009b: 93). However these changes are 
better understood as one institutional framework being replaced with 
another (Konings 2007: 27). The notion of a decline in political capacities 
vis-à-vis markets through deregulation is a powerful part of neoliberal 
ideology although this is not congruent with neoliberalism as practice 
(Konings 2009a: 110). Indeed, deregulation is not so much driven by 
ideology as by the necessity of having to respond to ‘financial dynamics 
which had already gathered decisive momentum’ by reconfiguring the legal 
environment in which they operate (Panitch and Konings 2009: 69). Rather 
than an outright ‘retreat of the state’, neoliberalism involves ‘a complex 
process of re-regulation’ (Konings 2009a: 110) and the ‘creation, 
legitimation and consolidation of new relations of control’ (Konings 2010: 
742).  
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Financial life in its entirety and down to its roots ‘is made up of 
relations of control supported by very complex institutional mechanisms’ 
(Konings 2009a: 122). In other words, it is about power and power is about 
agency, or how social forces attempt ‘to develop means to relate to a social 
reality that partly escapes their control and which they seek to influence or 
change’ (Knafo 2010: 510). While structures are ‘intimately tied to agency’ 
(Knafo 2010: 510) and create demands on behaviour, they do not 
automatically determine that there is only one way to respond to these 
demands (Knafo 2010: 504). The salience of institutions in the wielding and 
operation of power occurs through how they ‘leverage agency’ by 
transforming power from a ‘personal and direct relationship’ to a ‘structural, 
indirect relationship’ as social actors ‘only relate to institutional structures 
in the process of relating to other agents’ (Konings 2009b: 76). Institutions 
are ideological in nature and are necessarily opaque in order to grant them 
legitimacy and preserve the stability of social control (Konings 2010: 743) 
as ‘the state aims to make power work, not to expose its contradictions’ 
(Konings 2009a: 124). The public image of state institutions, such as the 
post office in Japan, are therefore integral in legitimising relations of control 
because a change in perception can provide the impetus or pretext for a 
change in these relations. 
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However, the difficulty in exerting power in constantly changing 
social contexts which create obstacles to achieving aims requires the 
introduction of a pragmatic dimension to the way structures are exploited. 
The pragmatic element in turn ‘shapes the motives that drive power’ as 
actors must constantly ‘adjust their strategies in order to gain leverage over 
what escapes their control’ (Knafo 2010: 510). Structural analysis tends to 
obscure agency but this can be overcome by focusing on ‘what is being 
achieved through … structures, rather than simply on the product that 
results from these actions’ by focusing on the agency of powerful social 
actors (Knafo 2010: 505). Rather than being a ‘teleological structural 
process, the socialization of capitalism has been mediated by concrete social 
agents’ (van den Berg 1995: 376).  
 
Some accounts of financialisation and the globalisation of finance 
present it as an attenuation of state power and convergence on an Anglo-
American, or neoliberal state, presuming that financialisation can only occur 
in conjunction with neoliberalism. Similarly, in challenging the association 
of financial speculation with liberalism, speculation has in the past emerged 
in ‘specific institutional structures’ not necessarily associated with liberal 
forms of governance (Knafo 2009: 128). Because ‘specificity is a historical 
question and concerns the nature of power, not the degree’ (Knafo 2013: 5), 
I now investigate how the process of financialisation has been mediated in 
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Japan. The immediate context for this is an account of the origins of the 
Japanese financial system. 
 
 
The Japanese financial system 
Japan’s financial infrastructure has largely existed since the Meiji 
period, beginning in 1868, which saw the introduction of capitalism. Wary 
of being colonised by the Western nations, the Meiji government 
implemented modernising reforms, modelled on the US and various 
European states (Malcolm 2001: 60). Pre-dating banks, a postal savings 
system (PSS) similar to that in the UK had been established in 1875. The 
population was induced to save through a combination of security, interest 
returns, and state campaigns. Control of the funds was allocated to the MOF 
and these were initially used to finance the state budget (Ferber 2002: 143). 
 
The post-World War I recession was intensified by the 1923 Great 
Kantō Earthquake. Bankruptcies in 1927 caused by speculation, together 
with the deeper financial crisis of the 1930s and the war effort saw a change 
from lax regulation to ‘stability and the channeling of finance for the 
achievement of public goals’ (Vitols 2001: 11). Aided by the government’s 
industrialisation drive, the zaibatsu, oligopolistic industrial conglomerates, 
came into being (Goldsmith 1983: 62-3). Bonds and equity provided most 
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finance, however regulation in response to economic instability and 
demands for patriotic saving to meet war requirements led to bank finance 
gaining precedence (Franks, Mayer and Miyajima 2009: 9-12; Horiuchi 
1996: 171-2).  
 
Following the Second World War, the US occupying forces set out 
to rebuild the Japanese financial system after the US model. They separated 
commercial and investment banking, where no such separation had 
previously existed (Dale 1990: 35), but with the need for a capitalist 
bulwark, the US decided against further weakening the pre-war capitalist 
class and industrial base and backpedalled on full zaibatsu reform (Burkett 
and Hart-Landsberg 2000: 93-4). Postal savings had previously financed the 
war effort but from 1953 were used to fund industrialisation (Calder 1990: 
49). The reformed zaibatsu, now called keiretsu, were rebuilt around main 
banks and under state influence (Cumings 1987: 64).  
 
A main bank system features a long-term relationship between a 
firm and a bank in which the bank provides credit but also has a role in 
corporate governance and monitoring through equity holdings (Aoki and 
Patrick 1994: 3). Japan’s system was also characterised as the “convoy 
system” as it moved at the speed of the slowest member in order to prevent 
bankruptcies; banks were given protection and guidance by regulators and 
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had to rescue businesses when required (Takahashi 2002: 127). Interest rates 
were regulated by the MOF, partly to maintain control over the financial 
system (S. K. Vogel 1996: 176). The post office fell under the jurisdiction 
of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) which determined 
its interest rates (Calder 1990: 32). 
 
The post-war system was based on isolation from international 
capital markets and resistance to free trade and capital flows, favouring 
instead the profitability and market share of domestic oligopolies who 
shared network relationships in predictable markets (Pempel 1999: 911-2). 
This system evolved in a stable political environment composed of four 
pillars: public consensus on achieving economic parity with the West; the 
existence of interest groups with political connections; a powerful and 
prestigious bureaucracy; and the uninterrupted rule of the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) (Curtis 1999: 39). High economic growth came to 
a sudden halt with the end of the fixed exchange rate system and the oil-
price shock of the early 1970s (Cargill and Royama 1988: 112, 127). 
Regulatory reform became continuous thereafter in response to a changed 
financial environment, necessitating a rethink of tactics and strategy (Cargill 
and Royama 1988: 21). 
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Financialisation in Japan 
Three essential and interconnected features of financialisation, 
concern the role of banks: the reduced reliance of large corporations on 
bank loans; the resultant refocusing of banks activities on households and 
investment banking; and the subsequent increased financial involvement of 
households as asset holders and debtors (Lapavitsas 2011: 611-2; dos Santos 
2009: 180-1). 
 
Corporations and bank finance 
Since the 1970s the traditional trend of bank-based finance in Japan 
has changed. Both the US and UK, often represented as market-based, are 
more accurately highly internally financed. Japan appeared to have 
converged on this system during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Large firms’ 
decreased reliance on bank finance meant that banks increased their lending 
to smaller firms and to businesses in the real estate, construction, finance 
and insurance sectors, which contributed to the asset price bubble. The 
subsequent asset crash and banking crisis were exogenous to firms and 
made both bank and equity finance unattractive. In response large firms 
lowered levels of investment and increased their use of internal finance, 
however smaller firms remained significantly bank-based (Corbett and 
Jenkinson 1997; Suzuki and Cobham 2005). Some apparent indications of 
financialisation, such as combining commercial and investment banking, 
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and reduced reliance on bank finance, are not historically unprecedented in 
Japan. They existed in the pre-World War I institutional structure and 
therefore do not necessarily signify convergence on Anglo-American norms.  
 
 
Transformation of banks’ activities 
Consequently, Japanese banks have transformed their activities with 
increased involvement in securities markets and a shift towards households. 
The MOF was convinced by the mid-1980s that it needed to end the strict 
compartmentalisation of the financial sector but favoured stability over 
efficiency (S. K. Vogel 1994: 238). Some barriers between banks and 
securities firms were lowered in 1992 (Kawai 2003: 27) and the removal of 
further barriers between the two sectors and the insurance sector was 
announced as part of the 1996 Big Bang. Contrary to the assertion that this 
was an attempt to attract international capital (Cerny 2005: 93) this has been 
considered an attempt to create new ‘national champions’ (Malcolm 2001: 
163). However, the removal of this separation was more rhetoric than 
practice involving concessions and compromise. The MOF used it ‘as a 
means to restore the balance of interests and power between market players’ 
and to maintain the convoy system (Malcolm 2001: 105-10). Before the 
mid-1970s commercial banks were more interested in focusing on the 
business sector as consumer credit took up only a small share of their loan 
portfolios (Cargill and Royama 1988: 33). Only in the 1980s did they begin 
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to view the household sector as a profitable market (Cargill and Yoshino 
2000: 222).  
 
Household involvement 
The turn towards households is connected to the financialisation of 
workers’ revenue. Households have decreased savings and increased 
borrowing while also increasing their holdings of financial assets to cover 
for stagnant wages and increased private provision of previously public 
services. The increased privatisation of workers’ consumption is also 
increasingly mediated by financial institutions, enabling them to profit from 
workers’ assets and ultimately routing savings to the stock market via 
various funds (Lapavitsas 2011: 620). 
 
Wage growth in Japan has stagnated since the mid-1970s 
(McKinnon 2007: 314). Japan was a high-saver country until this time but 
no longer is, chiefly because of the aging population (Horioka 2008: 37-47; 
2009: 2). Currency and deposits continue to be the most popular use of 
household funds by far, although their popularity has declined slightly since 
the high growth rate period and has been largely offset by a rise in insurance 
and pensions since the early 1980s. While the proportion of household funds 
held as securities has fluctuated, it is recently about the same as in 1975 
(Cargill and Royama 1988: 38; Bank of Japan 2015: 5). 
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Privatisation of public services has generally been extremely slow. 
There are as yet no charges for education in Japan so education-related debt 
is not a factor (Forrest and Hirayama 2009: 1003-1010). Nor is healthcare-
related debt as universal healthcare has been provided since 1961 (Shibuya, 
et al. 2011: 68). The pension system features a basic national pension for all, 
employee pension insurance, and since 2001, a personal retirement account 
(Hur 2010: 383). In the past, high savings rates meant a corresponding low 
rate of borrowing and with the more recent lower levels of saving, 
borrowing to finance general consumption has increased, although 
consumption is still low by G7 standards (Horioka 2004: 13-9). During the 
bubble period, household asset wealth effects were mostly confined to 
corporations. Household saving increased during the 1990s due to higher 
mortgages and the decline in land and asset prices (Maki 2006: 20-1).  
 
Japanese households thus maintain conservative asset portfolios 
consisting largely of deposits and housing, do not invest heavily in riskier 
assets, and their exposure to debt is smaller than in the West (Nakagawa and 
Yasui 2009: 76). In the following section I examine the key role of the post 
office in dictating the manner in which the financialisation process has 
unfolded. 
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The role of the post office 
While the US abolished its PSS in 1966 as an anachronism, as an 
‘agent of state economic power’, the Japanese Post Office ‘has no direct 
analogue’ (Calder 1990: 35). Its operation has been contentious and 
epitomises the nature of policy-making and financial reform in Japan which 
is most commonly ‘a story of bargaining and conflict between fractions of 
the state allied to groups of competing interests inside the industry’, where 
the various players ‘group and regroup in complex and shifting alliances 
according to the way particular regulatory issues affect their own complex 
interests’ (Moran 1991: 106-7). Although the post office has been a pivotal 
actor, it is not a unitary one and at different times opposes change and 
instigates it through innovation (Moran 1991: 107). Through this institution 
the Japanese state has influenced financialisation in crucial ways. 
 
Use of household savings 
Since the 1940s, US households were encouraged to take ‘a direct 
personal stake’ in equity markets, preceding neoliberalism’s mass 
investment culture (Aitken 2005) however, in Japan the ‘national saving 
behaviour’ is central (Meerschwam 1991: 218). Until the 1980s, the PSS 
built market share by aggressively pursuing deposits at the expense of banks 
because of ‘systematic government support’ (Calder 1990: 44-5). 
Additionally, its services were attractive to tax evaders (Cargill and Yoshino 
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2000: 210-3). PSS dominance hindered development of investment 
opportunities for households and perpetuated a high rate of saving. 
Although banks frequently complained, they prioritised the business sector 
over households. Mortgage and consumer credit took up only a small share 
of banks’ loan portfolios during the high-growth period because the 
household sector was ‘a supplier … rather than a user of funds’ which the 
financial system used to serve industry (Cargill and Royama 1988: 33). The 
PSS offered a slightly higher interest rate than banks, with earlier MOF 
attempts to deregulate deposit rates encountering political opposition. This, 
plus the reduced demand for corporate funding referred to earlier, meant 
that banks began calling for the liberalisation of interest rates and the 
relaxation of restrictions on offering new investment products and on 
diversification into new customer and portfolio areas (Malcolm 2001: 72). 
The PSS enjoyed favourable treatment for a number of reasons: it fell not 
under the regulatory jurisdiction of the MOF, but of the MPT; and it had 
powerful political allies, with even the opposition Socialists supporting PSS 
expansion (Calder 1990: 46). 
 
The post office was essentially a state bank but with deeper political 
implications because of how its funds were used. Funds were deposited with 
the Trust Fund Bureau (TFB) which was administered by the MOF and 
from there were channelled to the government’s Fiscal Investment and Loan 
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Program (FILP). Hence the MOF, despite banks’ leverage within it, also had 
an interest in maintaining a stable source of funds from the PSS.  
 
The use to which this opaque “second budget” was put was decided 
by MOF and LDP officials (Calder 1990: 45-9). These uses encompassed 
financing industrial development, housing, projects to improve living 
standards, helping small businesses (Doi and Hoshi 2003: 42), but also 
financing pork-barrel projects (Amyx, Takenaka and Toyoda 2005: 25-7). 
The use of FILP funds to support housing obstructed banks’ entry to the 
mortgage market until the late 1990s, although it has since expanded 
(Forrest and Hirayama 2009: 1006). The state has strategically used PSS 
funds since the early days of the financial system. Postal savings have had 
indirect effects on economic growth patterns through the uses to which 
funds have been put (Calder 1990: 49) but have also had direct effects on 
household saving and borrowing rates and on bank interaction with 
consumers. 
 
Public debt, liberalisation and reform 
A salient function of the PSS was that it allowed the state to borrow 
from the population, thus decreasing reliance on global markets, without 
expanding the monetary supply and was therefore a non-inflationary way to 
fund government deficits (Calder 1990: 51). This became particularly 
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important with the end of the fixed exchange system and the oil shock in the 
early 1970s. Government borrowing had risen steadily since the 1960s, 
partly on public projects to maintain LDP support and then to stimulate 
growth in response to the oil shock (Malcolm 2001: 72-3). Rising 
government debt funded by the PSS ‘became the spur that set the process of 
Japanese financial liberalisation in motion’ (Norville 1998: 116). To finance 
the ever-growing deficit, the bond markets were deregulated to permit more 
flexible methods of flotation which in turn stimulated secondary market 
development and increased pressure for interest-rate deregulation (M. J. 
Hall 1998: 20-1). The Japanese Government Bond (JGB) rates, which had 
been artificially low, anchored all rates, hence deregulation undermined the 
previously rigid interest-rate system. Politicians were unable to oppose the 
new regulation as they had initiated the increased borrowing (Malcolm 
2001: 73).  
 
Due to general agreement that past policy had been effective in 
generating high growth, there was no intense intellectual debate regarding 
liberalisation, unlike in the US. There, debate centred on the supposed evils 
of inflation, allowing ideas and policies which became the neoliberal 
paradigm to take root (Blyth 2002: 150). Although some state elements, 
such as the BOJ, are ideologically committed to liberalisation (Werner 
2005: 313), bond market liberalisation in Japan was a pragmatic response by 
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regulators because of the recognised incompatibility of the financial system 
with the effects of slower growth (Cargill and Royama 1988: 113) and was 
prompted by PSS-fuelled debt. 
 
Gradual financial reform was already firmly underway by 1983 but 
increased integration into global markets led to US demands for a rise in the 
value of the yen. The MOF published reform blueprints and while the 
substance satisfied foreign governments, the slow pace of implementation 
did not (M. J. Hall 1998: 23-4). However, this gave regulators the 
opportunity to use US pressure as a scapegoat to ‘make politically difficult 
internal changes that disrupted long-established relationships in the financial 
system’ (Cargill and Royama 1988: 125). Reforms in 1988, notably the end 
of tax exemptions on interest, saw PSS deposit growth slow. While these 
reforms allowed banks to compete for deposits, the MPT compensated for 
the loss of tax-free savings by being allowed to independently manage more 
of the deposits rather than diverting them to FILP. This increased indirect 
household investment in capital markets and benefited financial 
intermediaries; securities firms, fund advisors and brokers to the MPT 
(Calder 1990: 57-8; Cargill and Yoshino 2000: 217-8). 
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Domestic crisis and scandal 
The banking crisis of the 1990s saw a loss of confidence in the banks 
and deposits shifting back to the PSS (T. Suzuki 2007: 179). In order to 
restore confidence, the MOF and MPT agreed on some measures to lessen 
the attractiveness of the PSS (Cargill and Yoshino 2000: 219). The inept 
handling of the banking crisis caused a loss of confidence in the government, 
with politicians and ministries scrambling to protect their own power and 
avoid blame (S. K. Vogel 1999: 14; Immergut and Kume 2006: 4). The Big 
Bang of 1996 did not affect the post office but, prompted by public loss of 
faith in the bureaucracy due to scandal, the Hashimoto cabinet announced a 
programme for administrative reform, including privatisation of the post 
office (Amyx, Takenaka and Toyoda 2005: 33-4). Nearly every ministry 
benefitted from FILP and was hence loath to support reform (Amyx, 
Takenaka and Toyoda 2005: 30). Resistance from opposition parties, the 
MPT and some factions within the LDP forced a compromise instead of 
privatisation, with the intention of using market discipline to prevent 
savings from going into unproductive public investments (Vollmer, Dietrich 
and Bebenroth 2009: 10). Postal savings and insurance funds were to be no 
longer channelled to FILP but were instead invested in financial markets 
with FILP now raising most of its funds by issuing its own bonds (Doi and 
Hoshi 2003: 39, 57-8). Although this removed the automatic direction of 
PSS funds, they could still be ‘substantially used for FILP through the 
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purchase of government bonds’ (Ministry of Finance 2011: 41). This new 
market-based relation of control was thus a result of domestic political 
struggles and further increased indirect household involvement with capital 
markets. 
 
Privatisation 
Junichiro Koizumi was elected prime minister in 2001 on the agenda 
of post office privatisation for three reasons: to reduce financial sector 
inefficiency; to relieve PSS funds from the control of vested interests; and to 
reduce bureaucratic misuse of public funds (Vollmer, Dietrich and 
Bebenroth 2009: 11). Although political opposition used anti-American 
rhetoric, privatisation was driven mainly by domestic competitors 
(Suginohara 2008: 853-5). Internal party differences in Japan were usually 
about power rather than ideology (Beeson 2007: 108) making it difficult for 
the prime minister to have his way within his own party (Hirashima 2004: 
48). Reflecting this, Koizumi’s bill was passed in 2005 at the second 
attempt after dissolving the parliament and calling an election (Maclachlan 
2006: 13-4).  
 
Privatisation began in 2007 with Japan Post Holdings Co. holding 
the stock of four private companies, including Japan Post Bank Co. (JPB). 
The holding company was to be initially owned by the government and the 
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shares gradually sold off by 2017. Banks again benefited from massive 
shifts of deposits out of JPB, however it formed a new competitive threat as 
it needed to expand into new business areas to survive as a private company 
(Porges and Leong 2006: 6). Where it had once enjoyed a favourable public 
image, aided by an election scandal in 2001 the post office had come to be 
seen as ‘a symbol of “bloated public finance”’ by 2005 (Amyx, Takenaka 
and Toyoda 2005: 38-40), helping to garner public support for privatisation. 
 
However, with increased borrowing needed for stimulus spending 
during the economic crisis (Lim 2009: 4-5), the government announced 
plans in 2009 to halt privatisation and to retain a stake of more than 30 per 
cent, enough to give it a veto (Sano 2010). To enable further bond purchases, 
savers were again incentivised to shift their money to the post office, still 
seen as having an implicit state guarantee (The Economist 2010). But, as in 
the past, calamity intervened, this time in the shape of the 2011 Tōhuku 
earthquake and tsunami. Under the then-ruling Democratic Party, the 
previous suspension of the sale of the postal bank was lifted with the 
proceeds needed to finance urgent rebuilding (Sekiguchi 2012).  
 
With the LDP back in power under Shinzō Abe, the IPO finally took 
place in late 2015. In response to deep-rooted sluggish economy 
performance, long-term deflation and the continued conservative investment 
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habits of an ageing population, “Abenomics” was a set of polices intended 
to revive the economy through monetary policy, fiscal consolidation and a 
growth strategy (Yoshino and Taghizadeh-Hesary 2014: 1). An important 
part of this was the privatisation of the post office.  
 
As part of the quantitative easing programme, the BOJ needed to 
purchase more JGBs but couldn’t find enough on the secondary market 
(Pesek 2015). Attempts to expand lending by the post bank after 2007 had 
been largely unsuccessful; consequently it continued to fund state debt. At 
one point, it accounted for a third of the market with over 80 per cent of PSS 
funds used to buy JGBs, although this had fallen to 63 per cent in 2014 
(Japan Post Bank 2014: 2) and 45 per cent by 2016 (The Japan Times 
2016a). Privatisation was intended to force the bank to seek alternative 
investments with higher returns and thus hold fewer JGBs (Pesek 2015), 
also allowing the BOJ to purchase more of them. 
 
Similarly, Japanese households continued to hold conservative asset 
portfolios compared to the West, greatly preferring cash over riskier 
investments like shares (Yoshino and Taghizadeh-Hesary 2014: 3). 
Households directly financed only five per cent of JGBs, however this 
figure was over 50 per cent when considering indirect channels such as 
banks, including JPB, and pension funds (Tokuoka 2010: 15-16). While in 
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the past the government used the PSS to induce the population to save, the 
objective changed to encouraging people to spend. In contrast to Anglo-
American capitalism where neoliberalism was a reaction to inflation and 
initiated ‘a raft of privatisations’ (Docherty 2016), in Japan privatisation of 
the post office was intended to help generate inflation. To this end, 
privatisation aimed to further financialise households more in line with the 
West by building a ‘shareholding culture' through which they could profit 
from share ownership (Fensom 2015) and thus be encouraged to spend 
rather than save. 
 
Another way in which privatisation was to have a financialising 
effect was in posing a competitive threat to regional banks which previously 
had a monopoly in more rural areas (Oohama and Asai 2011: 246). With its 
branches throughout the country, the newly-privatised and competitive JPB 
was intended to induce consolidation among the many regional institutions 
(Emoto and Uranaka 2015). A reduction in regulation incentivising savers to 
use the JPB would further increase competition among banks in trying to 
attract households as customers. While the three biggest private banks had 
already refocused their profit-making activities outside Japan and on fee 
business (Kawamoto and Nozawa 2016), regional banks, which also heavily 
invested in JGBs, would also seek higher profits from riskier investments, 
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such as equities (Pesek 2015). Privatisation of JPB would therefore shift 
other banks’ activities further towards securities markets. 
 
The search for higher profits was also driven by the all-time low 
JGB yields after the BOJ announced negative interest rates in early 2016. 
However, JPB’s exposure to interest rate risk because of its large JGB 
holdings caused a substantial drop in the share price just months after the 
IPO, an event unlikely to cause a shareholding culture to take root among 
Japanese households and which saw a strengthening of the cultural 
preference for holding cash, as evidenced by a rise in sales of safes (Shen 
2016). Old habits die hard: in opposition to other banks complaints, the 
government raised the maximum deposit cap for JPB in April 2016 for the 
first time in 25 years (The Japan Times 2016b). Despite privatisation, the 
postal bank is still a channel for state action. 
 
The protracted and contested nature of privatisation thus highlights 
the specificity and contingency of financialisation in Japan and its continued 
distinctness from Anglo-American capitalism. Long an archetype of state 
instrumentality, even after privatisation the JPB continues to be a locus for 
the agency of domestic actors with varying goals as they react to ever-
changing circumstances. 
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Conclusion 
Themes prevalent in some of the literature on financialisation and on 
changes in Japanese capitalism, although recognizing various exponents of 
reform, are couched in terms of unstoppable convergence on Anglo-
American style capitalism. This is held to be mainly driven by continual 
liberalisation and deregulation as states in competition with each other court 
increasingly mobile global capital, leading to a persistent loss of state power. 
This can obscure the agency of social actors by assigning their fate to 
processes beyond their control.  
 
The significant characteristic of a postal bank ‘is not so much that it 
is “postal”, as that it is a government bank’ backed by the state (Kuwayama 
2000: 100). Created even before the banking system in the late nineteenth 
century, the postal saving and insurance systems functioned since then as a 
relation of control to divert savings to the state, influencing the interaction 
of banks with businesses and individuals. It has typified the contested and 
contradictory nature of Japanese policy-making and has been instrumental 
in colouring the pace and direction of financialisation. Its involvement in 
affecting the ebb and flow of savings between the PSS and banks, 
prompting liberalisation, influencing the extent of direct and indirect 
household involvement in capital markets, and determining the involvement 
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of financial intermediaries serve to highlight the varying extents and ways in 
which financialisation can occur outside Anglo-American capitalism. 
 
Examining the development of the Japanese financial system, the 
post office and some apparently liberal policies, highlights the pragmatic 
way in which the state has intervened to ‘shape market forces along lines 
that will enrich and empower Japan’ (Norville 1998: 112). Financialisation, 
therefore, is more complex and political than a strengthening of finance and 
a weakening of state power. Instead, it ‘should be understood as a process of 
transition rather than an end-state or destination’ (italics in original) 
(Malcolm 2001: 18) as it is the nature rather than the degree of power which 
is important. Ascertaining the extent of transition without examining the 
manner in which it has occurred only helps to overstate the power of 
structural forces, assigning them a logic of their own and overlooking the 
ways in which outcomes can be shaped. The result is thus not predetermined 
but is instead heavily contingent upon many factors including crisis, disaster, 
demographics and path-dependency, but most significantly the agency of a 
variety of domestic social actors, often with shifting and conflicting interests.  
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